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A cynic once said that economic forecasting is neither an art nor a
science -- it is a hazard.
meant.

~1ost

The present time is a good example of what he

forecasters are now lowering their predictions of real economic

growth for 1985 and 1986.

This shift corres soon after a period in which

economists were raising their projections of growth for the American economy.
Not too surprisingly, all this has not exactly inspired public confidence in
the

abili~

of economists to make reliable forecasts.

The harsh reality is

that economists are not good at estimating the economy's performance for very
short time periods, such as the next month or quarter.

However, the record

for forecasts of year-to-year changes is much better.
For example, each month a group of 50 professional economic forecasters
provides a consensus estimate for the year ahead.
Chip Economic Indicators.

The result is called Blue

The forecast made by the panel in October of each

year is especially important, because that month is the typical starting point
for the annual company planning cycle.
Over the past eight years, the Blue Chip panel's October estimates of
real growth for the next year have turned out to be within 1.2 percentage
points of the actual figure.

The record on inflation is about the same, with
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the Blue Chip panel averaging within 1.1 percentage points.

That record will

not qualify for the Guinness Book of vJorld Records, but it suggests why
government and business executives continue to rely on economic forecasts.
When we step back from the details of econometric models, we can spot
some basic trends.
the same song:

Virtually all forecasters are now singing a variation of

1985 and 1986 are not going to be nearly as good as 1984.

the economy will continue to grow, by · between 2 and 3 percent.

But

That compares

to a 1mo s t 7 percent 1as t year.
The basic reason for the slowdown is that domestic production is much
weaker than domestic consumption.
rising tide of imports.

The difference, of course, is due to the

For a while, consumer credit can finance the gap

between income earned and money spent.
reflects their income.

But most people's spending ultimately

Thus, the more modest pace of domestic production and

income generation is slowing down the purchases of American
As

usual~

~onsumers.

there is a range of viewpoints among professional forecasters.

The optimists see the GNP accelerating in 1986, as the economy gets its second
wind.

The pessimists expect the next recession to start some ti01e in the

coming 12 months.

Personally, I am in the middle of the road.

I do not now see the seeds of the next recession.
their sprouts are not yet visible to the naked eye.
precede a recession are not present.
standard surveys, remains high.

They may be there, but

The usual factors· that

Consumer sentiment, judged by the

Significant excess capacity exists in

American industry; in fact business investment continues at a high level.
Inventories are balanced with sales.

Interest rates are not rising; rather it

is the money supply that is rising at a rapid clip.

There is not much oomph

in the economy, but there is nothing seriously pushing it down.
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By 1986, however, the recovery will be four years old; that is rather
mature when we consider past business cycles.

It is not, however, an adequate

reason for projecting the end of the expansion in the economy.
occasion for sounding a note of caution.

It is an

The recovery is at the stage where

it is susceptible to all sorts of negative influences that could lead to a
down turn, but I do not now see the onset of recession.
HIGHLIGHTS OF ECONOMIC FORECAST
1985

1986

Real GNP

+2.4%

+3.0%

I nfl a ti on

+3.7%

+4.2%

7.2%

7.0%

Unemployment

Inflationary Expectations
\~i

th the i nfl a ti on rate hovering be tween 3 and 4 percent, it seems that

the alarmists who have been forecasting an early return to escalating if not
double digit inflation were wrong.

Surely, the specific forecasts for

high and rising inflation rates in 1984 and 1985 were off the board.
Nevertheless, I harbor a growing suspicion that the main error of some
monetarists and other inflation alarmists was in timing.

They forgot how long

it took to build up the inflationary pressures of the late 1970s.

On the

other hand, perhaps too many of us have quickly forgotten how painful it was,
as measured by high unemployment rates, to bring inflation down to current
levels.
What concerns the monetarists is the extremely rapid rate of growth in the
various monetary aggregates.

M1 --the most widely watched monetary

indicator-- has been rising at a 13 percent annual rate since early this
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year.

More specialized measures have also been expanding at a rapid rate.

For example, the monetary base (a key ingredient in future money supply
movements} has been expanding at a 9 percent rate since early in the year.
More sanguine observers point to technical shifts, such as changes in the
composition of deposits, to explain away the apparently excessive expansion of
the rro ney sup p1y •
I believe that the monetarists are crying wolf again.
however, is the way the fable ends.

What concerns me,

Eventually, the little boy was right.

And

some straws in the wind are worrisome.
\·Jhat cannot be readily explained away is the rise in measured inflationary
expectations.

According to one recent survey, financial decision-makers

anticipate that the inflation rate over the coming five years will be about
5 1/2 percent a year.

That is 170 basis points higher than the current

inflation rate.
According to some observers, today•s economic policy environment is
reminiscent of 1967, 1972, and 1977.

These were the periods prior to the

outbursts of rapid inflation in the fairly recent past.

History does not have

to repeat itself, but the current attitude toward inflation may be too
sanguine.
The International Outlook
Let us take a few minutes to examine the foreign trade situation.

The

fact is that the United States is running a triple digit trade deficit.
Meanwhile, Congress is searching for villains.
Let's face it.

If Congress restricts imports, that raises the danyer of

retaliation against our exports.

We

do

not have to guess about the

consequences or remember as far back as the Smoot Hawley tariff of the 1930s.
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Recent experience with China provides a good example.

When we imposed quotas

on their textile exports to us, they promptly reduced their agricultural and
chemical imports from us.

The U.S. textile industry got the benefits, while

our fdrmers and our chemical companies and their employees bore the costs.
A significant decline in the exchange rate of the dollar would be a far
better solution to our international trade problems than any of the
protectionist approaches.

The 40 percent rise in the dollar since 1980 means

a 40 percent price increase for U.S. firms competing against foreign goods.
But that, in turn, gets us to our own budget deficit, which is at the heart of
the superstrong dollar.

And that has strictly a made-in-America label.
The Fi sea 1 1986 Budget

Looking at the Washington scene, the annual buciget debate has become a
sad spectacle.

He all know what has to be done.

It is not a question of

bringing an outlandish $·200 billion deficit down to merely an outrageous $180
billion or a bloated $150 billion annual level.

It is a matter of restoring

our country•s finances to a semblance of balance.
To those who say that economic growth will cure our fiscal problems, I
respond that the next recession -- which we can neither pinpoint nor rule
out-- will push the budget deficit to a new peak.
least one more recession in the 1980s.

History argues for a"t

It will only take an average downturn

to accelerate government spending and slow down revenue sufficiently to
produce a deficit of $250 billion a year or more.
Washington•s favorite parlor game is still spin-the-budget.

But it now has

a new name, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment to the bill to raise the debt
limit to $2 trillion.

That amendment requires Congress and the President to
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reduce the deficit progressively until it is eliminated in fiscal 1991.

This

provision has been subjected to all sorts of criticism, some quite valid.

But

the fact remains that the Gramm approach is now the only legislative game in
town to eliminate the deficit.
with the status quo.

The -amendment reflects widespreaa exasperation

It surely is a challenge to the Congress and the

~Jhite

House to do a better job of bringing spending into line with revenues.
At first blush, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill seems to be an abdication
of the Congressional budget function to the President.
don•t cut enough, he has to do it.
serious than that.
generous

After all, if they

But, on reflection, the potential is more

The bill would let Congress do the popular thing-- enact

appropriations-~

while giving the President the onerous task of

cutting spending or proposing tax increases.
In any event, we must remember that the meter is running.
payments are mounting steadily.

Interest

Delay means choosing in the future between

even larger spending cuts and more unpopular tax increases.

The best way to

reduce the deficit-- and to lay the foundation for responsible tax reform in
the years ahead-- is to carry through that necessary pruning of federal
spending programs.
easy.

The key to reducing federal spending is simple but not

It is the ability to say no.
Tax Reform
Meanwhile, for most of 1985 politicians in both parties have been busy

diverting attention from the difficult question of cutting the deficit by
focusing on tax reform.

It is discouraging to hear the representatives of both

political parties on this subject.

If you listen to Democratic spokesmen, you

quickly learn that they are embracing tax reform in the hope that, in the
voters• eyes, such action will return the party to the nation•s mainstream.
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But the Republicans are not any better on that score.

They tell us that

the beauty of their current tax reform plan is that it will help to attract
blue collar families to the Republican party.

The problems facing our nation

deserve more serious responses than such exercises in cheap (or perhaps
expensive) politics.
When we push aside the labels attached to any of the proposed

11

reforms 11 of

the federal tax structure-- be they Rostenkowski 1 S approach, Kemp-Kasten,
Bradley-Gephardt, the November Treasury proposal, or the current Hhite House
recommendations --we find that they are all variations of the same theme:
reduce federal income taxes paid by American families and individuals and
offset the revenue loss by raising taxes on business.
Most of those

11

loophole 11 closers boil down to increasing taxes on

business, mainly by reducing incentives to investment.

What this means is that

the proposed tax reform will not really be economically neutral.

By

discouraging inves·tment the proposed tax changes would depress the economy,
preventing the achievement of revenue neutrality.

It also means a higher

budget deficit.
It is ironic that policymakers in Washington are seriously considering
such tax changes just as the growth rate is slowing down.

Moreover, many of

the industries hard hit by imports would be precisely those faced with the
largest tax increases.
competition?

Why worry about the problems of meeting foreign

Businesses don•t vote.

My sense of irony is further aroused by the fact that the investment
incentives adopted in 1981, which were then hailed as tax reform, are now
proposed for diminution also as part of tax reform.
invention of a political perpetual motion machine.

That sounds like the
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Hhen you think about the key economic challenges facing the U.S. in the
1980s -- foreign competition, farm and foreign debts, and huge budget
deficits

the tax reform now being discussed should be dismissed as

irrelevant.
Summary
I will recap briefly.

We are basically a strong and wealthy country that

is not managing its economic affairs too well.
are producing.

We are spending more than we are earning.

more than we are saving.
so-so.

We are consuming more than we
We are borrowing

As a result, the economic future is, in a phrase,

I see no recession in sight, but economic growth is resuming at a very

slON pace.

Unemployment is leveling off at a high level.

inflation is staying low for the time being.

On the bright side,

This is not a period that will go

down in the economic history books, but it is not nearly as baa as the doom and
gloom talk we continue to hear.

